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Achieving stability in heterogeneous societies 
ALEXEI SAVVATEEV * 
To divide or to unite? 
In many social, political, and economic situations indi-
viduals form groups rather than operate on their own. 
Countries coalesce in order to resist threats posed by 
external enemies, communities unite to share the costs 
of local public goods, and workers join labor unions to 
secure better employment contracts. In these situations 
individuals come together to take advantage of the in-
creasing returns to scale provided by large groups. 
Russia, China, India and other countries, however, them-
selves are composed of heterogeneous groups of indi-
viduals and regions. Wealth, culture, language, religion, 
geography, climate, and historical experience differenti-
ate these groups. Distinguishing characteristics within a 
country might be linked: different climate conditions, for 
example, promote different paths of industrial and agri-
cultural development ¾ a connection evident in the Medi-
terranean region of Europe and the southern United 
States. Consider, for instance, the US civil war, which 
was born out of attempts to impose uniform standards 
upon the economic and social heterogeneity within the 
young US federation. This observation supports the claim 
that the benefits of combination, the economies of scale, 
are not unlimited: in some situations, a decentralized 
organization is superior to a large, more unified social 
structure. Thus, instead of a “grand coalition” containing 
the entire population, we may observe the emergence of 
multiple subgroups smaller than the grand coalition. 
Political economy context 
The political economy of country formation and stability 
suggests that there are good reasons for a heterogeneous 
country to remain united, despite the fact that the result-
ing centralized policies will not be ideal from the point of 
view of individual regions. Chief among these reasons is, 
as already noted, the benefit from combination in facing 
external foes. But if some regions are displeased with the 
centralized policies, they may choose to secede. What 
characteristics are required to preclude such secession, to 
guarantee the stability of the unified country? For exam-
ple, is such a diverse country as Russia stable? And how is 
the diversity of Russian citizens accounted for in the rela-
tions among the regions of Russia? 
Increasing returns versus heterogeneity:  
no way out? 
The stability of a union or even of smaller subgroups, 
then, depends on the tradeoff between capturing increas-
ing returns to scale and satisfying diverse preferences. Is 
it possible that a society that is not sustainable in operat-
ing as only one group, the grand coalition, could be parti-
tioned into several groups that would be jointly stable? 
Could a federal structure be developed that would pro-
vide substantial joint benefits, while sufficiently respond-
ing to individual preferences, such that people within the 
federation would not seek out a different arrangement? 
The federal structure might offer a large degree of sub-
group autonomy, for instance, to increase the scope for 
responding to regional differences and disparities. 
If people or regions differ in only a single characteristic ¾ 
their interest in public parklands, say ¾ then it would 
seem that a federal structure consisting of two regions, 
each with the delegated authority to choose the extent of 
its public parks, would provide a stable structure. But if 
regions or individuals differ in many respects, then find-
ing a stable federal organization might be harder. In 
other words, the existence of stable structures is crucially 
dependent on the dimensionality of the “policy space”. In 
general, the severity of preference divergence rises when 
the number of policy dimensions on which disagreement 
is possible increases; with many dimensions of diversity, 
the search for a stable group structure becomes more 
challenging. Nevertheless, even simple, one-dimensional 
policy spaces (say, the choice of where to locate the capi-
tal city) might not permit a stable federal structure, even 
as the unified, grand coalition would also fail to be stable.  
Stabilizing transfers: back to socialism,  
or equalization works 
But the central government might have other policy lev-
ers at its disposal, beyond grants of autonomy. Sophisti-
cated use of such policy instruments, then, might induce 
stability within a federal structure. One possibility would 
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be to limit the dimensions of potential disagreement, 
perhaps by altering the preferences of individuals and 
regions. But changing the political preferences of a di-
verse population in a predictable direction is no easy task 
(nor is altering climatic or geographical characteristics!) 
But governments also control fiscal policies. In practice, 
central governments often target subsidies, directly or 
indirectly, towards dissatisfied or disadvantaged groups 
or regions (e.g., Navarra and the Basque country in 
Spain, the south of Italy, the Atlantic provinces in Can-
ada, and the western provinces in China).  
In our theoretical modeling, we examine the possibilities 
for fiscal transfers to promote stable federations. What 
we find is that transfer programs that provide a type of 
equality can indeed support the stability of a federation. 
Specifically, in societies where the ‘costs’ within each 
group are divided equally among members, a stable 
group structure always exists.  The relevant ‘costs’ are 
quite general, and go beyond direct monetary costs. The 
total costs within a group include the expenses of gov-
ernment operations, plus the sum of personalized costs 
borne by residents in the form of their dissatisfaction 
with the adopted policies ¾ policies which typically will 
be less than ideal from the perspective of the residents. 
Fiscal transfers could be used to equalize these costs, 
and hence to ensure stability. 
The theoretical result suggests an empirical follow-up: the 
characterization of transfer schemes implemented in vari-
ous countries. In particular, to assess the potential stability 
of the Russian Federation, we can contrast its transfer 
formulas with the redistribution mechanisms employed in 
Europe, Asia, Australia and North and South America. 
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